Journal Articles |
Cureton, Adam Unity of Reasons Journal Article Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19 (4), pp. 877-895, 2016. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Moral theory @article{Cureton2016, title = {Unity of Reasons}, author = {Adam Cureton}, url = {http://philpapers.org/rec/CURUOR http://adamcureton.campus.utk.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Unity-of-Reasons-Revised-website.pdf}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-04-20}, journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice}, volume = {19}, number = {4}, pages = {877-895}, abstract = {There are at least two basic normative notions: rationality and reasons. The dominant normative account of reasons nowadays, which I call primitive pluralism about reasons, holds that some reasons are normatively basic and there is no underlying normative explanation of them in terms of other normative notions. Kantian constructivism about reasons, understood as a normative rather than a metaethical claim, holds that rationality is the primitive normative notion that picks out which non-normative facts are reasons for what and explains why those normative relations hold. By supposing that there is a plurality of primitive reasons, I argue that primitive pluralism about reasons lacks sufficient normative unity and structure. But Kantian constructivism about reasons faces a dilemma of its own: Either a conception of rationality is thick enough to capture the reasons of commonsense, in which case it cannot play the explanatory role assigned to it, or a conception of rationality is genuinely explanatory, in which case it is too thin to generate the reasons we recognize in commonsense. The aim of this paper is to suggest that if Kantian constructivism about reasons were built on a substantive, rather than merely formal, conception of rationality then it would stand a better chance at unifying the particular reasons we would endorse on due reflection. The groundwork I lay in this paper, I explain, is an essential first step in the larger project of developing a version of Kantian constructivism about reasons that might eventually explain all reasons in terms of rationality. }, keywords = {Moral theory}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } There are at least two basic normative notions: rationality and reasons. The dominant normative account of reasons nowadays, which I call primitive pluralism about reasons, holds that some reasons are normatively basic and there is no underlying normative explanation of them in terms of other normative notions. Kantian constructivism about reasons, understood as a normative rather than a metaethical claim, holds that rationality is the primitive normative notion that picks out which non-normative facts are reasons for what and explains why those normative relations hold. By supposing that there is a plurality of primitive reasons, I argue that primitive pluralism about reasons lacks sufficient normative unity and structure. But Kantian constructivism about reasons faces a dilemma of its own: Either a conception of rationality is thick enough to capture the reasons of commonsense, in which case it cannot play the explanatory role assigned to it, or a conception of rationality is genuinely explanatory, in which case it is too thin to generate the reasons we recognize in commonsense. The aim of this paper is to suggest that if Kantian constructivism about reasons were built on a substantive, rather than merely formal, conception of rationality then it would stand a better chance at unifying the particular reasons we would endorse on due reflection. The groundwork I lay in this paper, I explain, is an essential first step in the larger project of developing a version of Kantian constructivism about reasons that might eventually explain all reasons in terms of rationality. |
Cureton, Adam Offensive Beneficence Journal Article Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2 (1), pp. 74-90, 2016. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Disability, Kant, Moral theory, Practical ethics @article{Cureton2016, title = {Offensive Beneficence}, author = {Adam Cureton}, url = {http://adamcureton.campus.utk.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Cureton-Offensive-Beneficence.pdf}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-04-15}, journal = {Journal of the American Philosophical Association}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {74-90}, abstract = {Simple acts of kindness that are performed sincerely and with evident good will can also, paradoxically, be received as deeply insulting by the people we succeed in benefiting. When we are moved to help someone out of genuine concern for her, when we have no intention to humiliate or embarrass her and when we succeed at benefiting her, how can our generosity be disparaging or demeaning to her? Yet, when the tables are turned, we sometimes find ourselves brusquely refusing assistance from others or accepting it only grudgingly while trying to show that we do not need their charity. People with disabilities often find ourselves in situations of this sort, where we bristle at others who, for example, rush to open doors for us, while our kindhearted benefactors are surprised and hurt by the cold reception they receive for their efforts. My aim is to explain some of the ways in which well-intentioned and effective beneficence can be offensive, with special emphasis on cases in which someone provides assistance to a disabled person because of a perceived need that arises from that person’s disability. I distinguish three kinds of respect for persons and explain how beneficent actions toward people with disabilities can be disrespectful in each of these ways. The main point is that there are moral reasons for demanding help from others that is owed, resisting aid that is not, while showing appreciation for the kindness we do receive and the good-will of those who give it.}, keywords = {Disability, Kant, Moral theory, Practical ethics}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Simple acts of kindness that are performed sincerely and with evident good will can also, paradoxically, be received as deeply insulting by the people we succeed in benefiting. When we are moved to help someone out of genuine concern for her, when we have no intention to humiliate or embarrass her and when we succeed at benefiting her, how can our generosity be disparaging or demeaning to her? Yet, when the tables are turned, we sometimes find ourselves brusquely refusing assistance from others or accepting it only grudgingly while trying to show that we do not need their charity. People with disabilities often find ourselves in situations of this sort, where we bristle at others who, for example, rush to open doors for us, while our kindhearted benefactors are surprised and hurt by the cold reception they receive for their efforts. My aim is to explain some of the ways in which well-intentioned and effective beneficence can be offensive, with special emphasis on cases in which someone provides assistance to a disabled person because of a perceived need that arises from that person’s disability. I distinguish three kinds of respect for persons and explain how beneficent actions toward people with disabilities can be disrespectful in each of these ways. The main point is that there are moral reasons for demanding help from others that is owed, resisting aid that is not, while showing appreciation for the kindness we do receive and the good-will of those who give it. |
Cureton, Adam Making Room for Rules Journal Article Philosophical Studies, 17 (2), pp. 737-759, 2015. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Moral theory @article{Cureton2015, title = {Making Room for Rules}, author = {Adam Cureton}, url = {http://philpapers.org/rec/CURMRF http://adamcureton.campus.utk.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Cureton-Making-room-for-rules-April-20-2014.pdf}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-08-20}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {17}, number = {2}, pages = {737-759}, abstract = {Kantian moral theories must explain how their most basic moral values of dignity and autonomy should be interpreted and applied to human conditions. Rather than simply relying on intuitions to determine what these values require in specific contexts, those who are inspired by Kant should aim for more structured and systematic ways of bringing abstract moral considerations down to real world circumstances. One place Kantians should look for inspiration is, surprisingly, the utilitarian tradition and its emphasis on generally accepted, informally enforced, publicly known moral rules of the sort that help us give assurances, coordinate our behavior, and overcome weak wills. Kantians have tended to ignore utilitarian discussions of public moral rules by Hume, Mill, Rawls, Richard Brandt and Brad Hooker, but there are important structural lessons Kantians can learn from utilitarian views about how public moral rules can help to bridge the divide between thin moral values and everyday contexts. When we consider how a Kantian might make room for public moral rules, Kant himself is not much help, so we should look instead to contemporary Kantians, such as Thomas Hill, Barbara Herman and John Rawls. Drawing on these sources, I describe some features of a multi-stage Kantian framework that is structurally similar to rule-utilitarianism and I argue that, from the perspective of ideal human legislators who are choosing moral principles for a society of rational human beings in the natural world, there are strong grounds for establishing a system of generally accepted and socially enforced moral rules.}, keywords = {Moral theory}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Kantian moral theories must explain how their most basic moral values of dignity and autonomy should be interpreted and applied to human conditions. Rather than simply relying on intuitions to determine what these values require in specific contexts, those who are inspired by Kant should aim for more structured and systematic ways of bringing abstract moral considerations down to real world circumstances. One place Kantians should look for inspiration is, surprisingly, the utilitarian tradition and its emphasis on generally accepted, informally enforced, publicly known moral rules of the sort that help us give assurances, coordinate our behavior, and overcome weak wills. Kantians have tended to ignore utilitarian discussions of public moral rules by Hume, Mill, Rawls, Richard Brandt and Brad Hooker, but there are important structural lessons Kantians can learn from utilitarian views about how public moral rules can help to bridge the divide between thin moral values and everyday contexts. When we consider how a Kantian might make room for public moral rules, Kant himself is not much help, so we should look instead to contemporary Kantians, such as Thomas Hill, Barbara Herman and John Rawls. Drawing on these sources, I describe some features of a multi-stage Kantian framework that is structurally similar to rule-utilitarianism and I argue that, from the perspective of ideal human legislators who are choosing moral principles for a society of rational human beings in the natural world, there are strong grounds for establishing a system of generally accepted and socially enforced moral rules. |
Cureton, Adam From Self-Respect to Respect for Others Journal Article Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94 , pp. 166-187, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Kant, Moral theory @article{Cureton2013, title = {From Self-Respect to Respect for Others}, author = {Adam Cureton}, url = {http://philpapers.org/rec/CURFST}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-02-06}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {94}, pages = {166-187}, abstract = {The leading accounts of the content and grounds of respect for others tend to assume that persons have a rational nature, which is an intrinsic and “awesome” value that should be respected accordingly. Some who worry about this apparently ungrounded starting point are driven to pare back on the requirements of respect for others. I argue that Kant employs a radically different and very powerful argumentative strategy, one of historical and contemporary interest, for specifying and justifying other-regarding moral requirements. The duties of beneficence and respect toward others depend on the conjunction of our substantive and self-regarding rational dispositions and our rational disposition to universalize, reciprocate and grant the same to others. Because of our rational interests in our own happiness and self-respect, along with our rational willingness to reciprocate, we all would rationally will other-regarding duties of beneficence and respect when legislating under the condition of universalizability.}, keywords = {Kant, Moral theory}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The leading accounts of the content and grounds of respect for others tend to assume that persons have a rational nature, which is an intrinsic and “awesome” value that should be respected accordingly. Some who worry about this apparently ungrounded starting point are driven to pare back on the requirements of respect for others. I argue that Kant employs a radically different and very powerful argumentative strategy, one of historical and contemporary interest, for specifying and justifying other-regarding moral requirements. The duties of beneficence and respect toward others depend on the conjunction of our substantive and self-regarding rational dispositions and our rational disposition to universalize, reciprocate and grant the same to others. Because of our rational interests in our own happiness and self-respect, along with our rational willingness to reciprocate, we all would rationally will other-regarding duties of beneficence and respect when legislating under the condition of universalizability. |
Cureton, Adam Solidarity and Social Moral Rules Journal Article Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15 (5), pp. 691-706, 2012. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Moral theory @article{Cureton2012, title = {Solidarity and Social Moral Rules}, author = {Adam Cureton}, url = {http://philpapers.org/rec/CURFST}, year = {2012}, date = {2012-11-01}, journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice}, volume = {15}, number = {5}, pages = {691-706}, abstract = {The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we ‘fetishize’ or ‘worship’ if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us.}, keywords = {Moral theory}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we ‘fetishize’ or ‘worship’ if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us. |
Cureton, Adam Degrees of Fairness and Proportional Chances Journal Article Utilitas, 21 (2), pp. 217-221, 2009. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Moral theory @article{Cureton2009, title = {Degrees of Fairness and Proportional Chances}, author = {Adam Cureton}, url = {http://philpapers.org/rec/CURDOF}, year = {2009}, date = {2009-06-01}, journal = {Utilitas}, volume = {21}, number = {2}, pages = {217-221}, abstract = {Suppose the following: Two groups of people require our aid but we can help only one group; there are more people in the first group than the second group; every person in both groups has an equal claim on our aid; and we have a duty to help and no other special obligations or duties. I argue that there exists at least one fairness function, which is a function that measures the goodness of degrees of fairness, that implies that we should follow a procedure of proportional chances to determine which group to aid.}, keywords = {Moral theory}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Suppose the following: Two groups of people require our aid but we can help only one group; there are more people in the first group than the second group; every person in both groups has an equal claim on our aid; and we have a duty to help and no other special obligations or duties. I argue that there exists at least one fairness function, which is a function that measures the goodness of degrees of fairness, that implies that we should follow a procedure of proportional chances to determine which group to aid. |
Collections |
Cureton, Adam; Hill, Thomas (Ed.) Disability in Practice: Attitudes, Policies and Relationships Collection under contract with Oxford University Press, 2017. BibTeX | Tags: Disability, Kant, Moral theory, Practical ethics @collection{Cureton2017c, title = {Disability in Practice: Attitudes, Policies and Relationships}, editor = {Adam Cureton and Thomas Hill}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-08-01}, publisher = {under contract with Oxford University Press}, keywords = {Disability, Kant, Moral theory, Practical ethics}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {collection} } |
Incollections |
Hill, Thomas; Cureton, Adam Kant on Virtue: Seeking the Ideal in Human Conditions Incollection Snow, Nancy (Ed.): Oxford Handbook of Virtue (Forthcoming), Oxford University Press, 2017. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Kant, Moral theory @incollection{Cureton2017, title = {Kant on Virtue: Seeking the Ideal in Human Conditions}, author = {Thomas Hill and Adam Cureton}, editor = {Nancy Snow}, url = {http://adamcureton.campus.utk.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Hill-and-Cureton-Kantian-Virtue-Seeking-the-Ideal-in-Human-Conditions.pdf}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, volume = {Oxford Handbook of Virtue}, number = {Forthcoming}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {Immanuel Kant defines virtue as a kind of strength and resoluteness of will to resist and overcome any obstacles that oppose fulfilling our moral duties. Human agents, according to Kant, owe it to ourselves to strive for perfect virtue by fully committing ourselves to morality and by developing the fortitude to maintain and execute this life-governing policy despite obstacles we may face. This essay reviews basic features of Kant’s conception of virtue and then discusses the role of emotions, a motive of duty, exemplars, rules, and community in a virtuous life. Kant thinks that striving to be more virtuous requires not only respect for moral principles and control of our contrary emotions but also a system of legally enforced rules and communities of good persons. Exemplars and cultivated good feelings and emotions can also be useful aids along the way, but Kant warns us against attempting to derive our moral standards themselves from examples or feelings. The best any of us can hope for, in Kant’s view, is to make constant progress in our difficult struggle for moral perfection.}, keywords = {Kant, Moral theory}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {incollection} } Immanuel Kant defines virtue as a kind of strength and resoluteness of will to resist and overcome any obstacles that oppose fulfilling our moral duties. Human agents, according to Kant, owe it to ourselves to strive for perfect virtue by fully committing ourselves to morality and by developing the fortitude to maintain and execute this life-governing policy despite obstacles we may face. This essay reviews basic features of Kant’s conception of virtue and then discusses the role of emotions, a motive of duty, exemplars, rules, and community in a virtuous life. Kant thinks that striving to be more virtuous requires not only respect for moral principles and control of our contrary emotions but also a system of legally enforced rules and communities of good persons. Exemplars and cultivated good feelings and emotions can also be useful aids along the way, but Kant warns us against attempting to derive our moral standards themselves from examples or feelings. The best any of us can hope for, in Kant’s view, is to make constant progress in our difficult struggle for moral perfection. |
Cureton, Adam The Concept of Right as the Proper Adjudication of Conflicting Claims Incollection Timmons, Mark (Ed.): forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Oxford University Press, 2017. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Metaethics, Moral theory @incollection{Cureton2017, title = {The Concept of Right as the Proper Adjudication of Conflicting Claims}, author = {Adam Cureton}, editor = {Mark Timmons}, url = {http://adamcureton.campus.utk.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/aa-revised-Rawls-on-the-concept-of-right.pdf}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, booktitle = {forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {John Rawls makes a provocative, original, but largely underdeveloped and neglected suggestion about the most basic subject-matter and aims of normative ethical theory. Scattered across his published writings, Rawls proposes that the moral concept of ‘right’, which we use when we call an individual action or social practice morally right or wrong, is defined by the functional role it has of properly adjudicating conflicting claims that persons make on one another and on social practices. Substantive moral theories of right and wrong, including utilitarianism, Kantianism and contractualism, are supposed to provide more specific principles, criteria, values and ideals for interpreting and resolving this fundamental moral problem. The meaning of Rawls’ definition of right, however, is not obvious. It is not immediately apparent what moral problem he thinks substantive theories of right are supposed to interpret and address. The aim of this paper is to offer a fuller account of what Rawls could have meant by defining the concept of right as the proper adjudication of conflicting claims that persons make on one another or on social practices. I also describe and assess three implications of this expanded definition of right and I end with two reasons why one might accept some version of it.}, keywords = {Metaethics, Moral theory}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {incollection} } John Rawls makes a provocative, original, but largely underdeveloped and neglected suggestion about the most basic subject-matter and aims of normative ethical theory. Scattered across his published writings, Rawls proposes that the moral concept of ‘right’, which we use when we call an individual action or social practice morally right or wrong, is defined by the functional role it has of properly adjudicating conflicting claims that persons make on one another and on social practices. Substantive moral theories of right and wrong, including utilitarianism, Kantianism and contractualism, are supposed to provide more specific principles, criteria, values and ideals for interpreting and resolving this fundamental moral problem. The meaning of Rawls’ definition of right, however, is not obvious. It is not immediately apparent what moral problem he thinks substantive theories of right are supposed to interpret and address. The aim of this paper is to offer a fuller account of what Rawls could have meant by defining the concept of right as the proper adjudication of conflicting claims that persons make on one another or on social practices. I also describe and assess three implications of this expanded definition of right and I end with two reasons why one might accept some version of it. |
Cureton, Adam Constructivism Incollection Gibbons, Michael T (Ed.): Encyclopedia of Political Thought, Encyclopedia of Political Thought , 2014, (Forthcoming in the Encyclopedia of Political Thought). Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Kant, Moral theory, Political theory @incollection{Cureton2014, title = {Constructivism}, author = {Adam Cureton}, editor = {Michael T. Gibbons}, url = {http://web.utk.edu/~acureto1/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Cureton-Constructivism.pdf}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-10-01}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Political Thought}, volume = {Encyclopedia of Political Thought}, abstract = {An encyclopedia article on constructivism.}, note = {Forthcoming in the Encyclopedia of Political Thought}, keywords = {Kant, Moral theory, Political theory}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {incollection} } An encyclopedia article on constructivism. |
Cureton, Adam; Hill, Thomas Supererogation Incollection LaFollette, Hugh (Ed.): International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Kant, Moral theory @incollection{Cureton2013, title = {Supererogation}, author = {Adam Cureton and Thomas Hill}, editor = {Hugh LaFollette}, url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781444367072}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-02-01}, booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of Ethics}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, abstract = {An encyclopedia article on supererogation.}, keywords = {Kant, Moral theory}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {incollection} } An encyclopedia article on supererogation. |
Unpublished |
Cureton, Adam Reasonable Hope in Kant's ethics Unpublished 2016. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Kant, Moral theory @unpublished{Cureton2016, title = {Reasonable Hope in Kant's ethics}, author = {Adam Cureton}, url = {http://adamcureton.campus.utk.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Cureton-Reasonable-hope-in-Kants-ethics.pdf}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-02-06}, booktitle = {Economics and the Virtues: Building a New Moral Foundation}, volume = {Forthcoming}, abstract = {The most apparent obstacles to a just, enlightened and peaceful social world are also, according to Immanuel Kant, nature’s way of compelling us to realize those good ends. Echoing Adam Smith’s idea of the “invisible hand,” Kant thinks that selfishness, rivalry, quarrelsomeness, vanity, jealousy and self-conceit, along with the oppressive social inequalities they tend to produce, drive us to perfect our talents, develop culture, approach enlightenment, and, through the strife and instability caused by our unsocial sociability, push us towards justice, political equality and the highest good. What are we to make of these arguments, which seem to rely on questionable empirical assumptions, invoke dubious claims about natural teleology, and sit uncomfortably with fundamental aspects of Kant’s ethical framework I suggest that the arguments reveal one of Kant’s deep and important insight about the moral life by partially describing what a good and virtuous person reasonably hopes for}, keywords = {Kant, Moral theory}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {unpublished} } The most apparent obstacles to a just, enlightened and peaceful social world are also, according to Immanuel Kant, nature’s way of compelling us to realize those good ends. Echoing Adam Smith’s idea of the “invisible hand,” Kant thinks that selfishness, rivalry, quarrelsomeness, vanity, jealousy and self-conceit, along with the oppressive social inequalities they tend to produce, drive us to perfect our talents, develop culture, approach enlightenment, and, through the strife and instability caused by our unsocial sociability, push us towards justice, political equality and the highest good. What are we to make of these arguments, which seem to rely on questionable empirical assumptions, invoke dubious claims about natural teleology, and sit uncomfortably with fundamental aspects of Kant’s ethical framework I suggest that the arguments reveal one of Kant’s deep and important insight about the moral life by partially describing what a good and virtuous person reasonably hopes for |